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DUNWODY DISTINGUISHED LECTURE IN LAW
NO SMALL FEAT: WHO WON THE HEALTH CARE CASE (AND
WHY DID SO MANY LAW PROFESSORS MISS THE BOAT)?
Randy E. Barnett∗ †
Abstract
In this Essay, prepared as the basis for the 2013 Dunwody
Distinguished Lecture in Law at the University of Florida Levin College
of Law, I describe five aspects of the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius
that are sometimes overlooked or misunderstood: (1) the Court held that
imposing economic mandates on the people was unconstitutional under
the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses; (2) Chief Justice
John Roberts’s reasoning was the holding in the case, whether viewed
from a formalist or a realist perspective; (3) the Court did not uphold the
constitutionality of the individual insurance mandate under the tax
power; (4) the newfound power to tax inactivity is far less dangerous
than the commerce power advocated for by the Government and most
law professors; and (5) the doctrine established by NFIB matters (to the
extent that constitutional law doctrine ever matters). Finally, I turn my
attention to the question of why so many law professors got this case so
wrong. After providing a lengthy compendium of law professors’
published opinions about the case, I suggest that most missed the boat
because they have failed to appreciate the constitutional gestalt that
informed the Rehnquist Court’s New Federalism and carried over to a
majority of the Roberts Court.
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INTRODUCTION
The legal challenge to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act1 (ACA)—commonly known as Obamacare2—which I advocated as
a law professor3 before representing the National Federation of
Independent Business (NFIB) as one of its lawyers, was about two big
things: saving the country from Obamacare and saving the Constitution
for the country. To my great disappointment, we lost the first point in
the Supreme Court’s 5–4 ruling to uphold the healthcare law. But to my
enormous relief, we won the second.
Before the decision, I figured it was all or nothing. If we lost on
Obamacare, it would mean the Government’s (and law professors’)
reading of the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses would
prevail. If we won, it would be because the Court affirmed our theories
of the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses. But, as it
happened, although we did not succeed in invalidating the ACA, five
Justices affirmed our view of the Commerce and Necessary and Proper
Clauses. And the reasons advanced by the Government, by most law
professors, and by the four liberal Justices in Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg’s concurring opinion for upholding the ACA were rejected.
So the question, “Who won the case?” is actually a complicated one
to answer, as it depends on what might have been decided as distinct
from what actually was decided. It depends on what you think the
constitutional law baseline was before the decision. And it depends on
how much you think constitutional law doctrine matters. In this Essay, I
examine these issues. I then turn to the issue of why so many law
professors so misjudged the legal reasoning that a majority of the
Supreme Court adopted in this case.
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat.
119 (2010).
2. See, e.g., ORGANIZING FOR ACTION, I LIKE OBAMACARE, http://www.barackobama.com/
i-like-obamacare (last visited Mar. 27, 2013).
3. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health
Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581 (2010).
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I. ECONOMIC MANDATES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
This battle for the Constitution was forced upon defenders of limited
government by Congress in 2010, when the Democrats in Congress
insisted in the healthcare bill that it was constitutional to require all
Americans to purchase insurance or pay a fine as a regulation of
interstate commerce. This claim of power was literally and legally
unprecedented.4 In the findings of the ACA, lawmakers argued that this
mandate was justified by the Constitution’s Commerce and Necessary
and Proper Clauses.5 Had we not contested this power grab, Congress’s
regulatory powers would have been rendered limitless. They are not.
On that point, we prevailed completely. Indeed, the case has put us
ahead of where we were before the ACA. Five Justices of the Supreme
Court have now definitively ruled that the Commerce Clause, Necessary
and Proper Clause, and spending power have limits; that the mandate to
purchase private health insurance, as well as the threat to withhold
Medicaid funding unless states agree to expand their coverage,
exceeded these limits; and that the Court will enforce these limits. This
was huge.
On the Commerce Clause, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and four
dissenting Justices accepted all of our side’s arguments about why the
insurance mandate exceeded Congress’s power. “The individual
mandate cannot be upheld as an exercise of Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause,” Chief Justice Roberts wrote.6 “That Clause
authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce, not to order
individuals to engage in it.”7
Chief Justice Roberts adopted this view for the precise reason we
advanced: granting Congress this power would gravely limit the
liberties of the people. As he put it: “Allowing Congress to justify
federal regulation by pointing to the effect of inaction on commerce
would bring countless decisions an individual could potentially make
within the scope of federal regulation, and—under the Government’s
theory—empower Congress to make those decisions for him.”8
Regarding the Necessary and Proper Clause, supporters of the
healthcare overhaul had invoked the power of Congress “[t]o make all
4. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, No. 11-393, slip op. at 18 (U.S. June 28,
2012) [hereinafter NFIB] (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (“Congress has never attempted to rely on
that power to compel individuals not engaged in commerce to purchase an unwanted product.”).
5. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(a)(1),
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (“The individual responsibility requirement provided for in this
section . . . is commercial and economic in nature, and substantially affects interstate commerce,
as a result of the effects described in paragraph (2).”).
6. NFIB, supra note 4, at 58 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 21.
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Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers,”9 seeing it as a constitutional carte blanche to
adopt any means to facilitate the regulation of insurance companies that
did not violate an express constitutional prohibition. Chief Justice
Roberts squarely rejected this argument: “Even if the individual
mandate is ‘necessary’ to the Act’s insurance reforms, such an
expansion of federal power is not a ‘proper’ means for making those
reforms effective.”10 Significantly, he did not rest this finding of
impropriety on any express prohibition in the Constitution, but on the
threat of this invocation of power to undermine the enumerated powers
scheme that is the federalist “spirit of the Constitution”:
[W]e have also carried out our responsibility to declare
unconstitutional those laws that undermine the structure of
government established by the Constitution. Such laws,
which are not “consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the
constitution,” McCulloch, . . . are not “proper [means] for
carrying into Execution” Congress’s enumerated powers.
Rather, they are, “in the words of The Federalist, ‘merely
acts of usurpation’ which ‘deserve to be treated as such.’”
Printz v. United States . . . (alterations omitted) (quoting
The Federalist No. 33, at 204 (A. Hamilton)).11
From this, the Chief Justice concluded: “Applying these principles, the
individual mandate cannot be sustained under the Necessary and Proper
Clause as an essential component of the insurance reforms.”12
Tellingly, the Chief Justice soundly rejected the reasoning that, for
two years, had been offered by the Government and academic defenders
of the insurance mandate:
Indeed, the Government’s logic would justify a mandatory
purchase to solve almost any problem. . . . . To consider a
different example in the health care market, many
Americans do not eat a balanced diet. That group makes up
a larger percentage of the total population than those
without health insurance. . . . . The failure of that group to
have a healthy diet increases health care costs, to a greater
extent than the failure of the uninsured to purchase
insurance. . . . . Those increased costs are borne in part by
other Americans who must pay more, just as the uninsured
shift costs to the insured. . . . . Congress addressed the
9.
10.
11.
12.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
NFIB, supra note 4, at 30 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
Id. at 28–29.
Id. at 29.
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insurance problem by ordering everyone to buy insurance.
Under the Government’s theory, Congress could address
the diet problem by ordering everyone to buy vegetables.13
He then continued:
People, for reasons of their own, often fail to do things
that would be good for them or good for society. Those
failures—joined with the similar failures of others—can
readily have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Under the Government’s logic, that authorizes Congress to
use its commerce power to compel citizens to act as the
Government would have them act.
That is not the country the Framers of our Constitution
envisioned. . . . . Congress already enjoys vast power to
regulate much of what we do. Accepting the Government’s
theory would give Congress the same license to regulate
what we do not do, fundamentally changing the relation
between the citizen and the Federal Government.14
For these reasons, the Court held that economic mandates are
unconstitutional under both the Commerce and Necessary and Proper
Clauses.15
As for the spending power, while the Court has previously
invalidated statutes that exceeded the Commerce Clause, not since the
New Deal had it rejected a law for exceeding the spending power of
Congress—until NFIB v. Sebelius. The Court invalidated the part of the
ACA that empowered the Department of Health and Human Services to
coerce the states by withholding Medicaid funding for existing
programs unless the states accepted new coverage requirements.16
All of this represents a fundamental departure from how most law
professors viewed constitutional law before this decision.17 Under the
holding of NFIB, economic mandates are unconstitutional.18

13. Id. at 22–23 (citations omitted).
14. Id. at 23–24 (emphasis added); accord Barnett, supra note 3, at 583 (“A newfound
congressional power to impose economic mandates to facilitate the regulation of interstate
commerce would fundamentally alter the relationship of citizen and state by unconstitutionally
commandeering the people.”) (emphasis added).
15. See NFIB, supra note 4, at 30, 32, 58 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
16. See id. at 56 (“[W]e determine . . . that § 1396c is unconstitutional when applied to
withdraw existing Medicaid funds from States that decline to comply with the expansion.”).
17. See infra Part VI.
18. See NFIB, supra note 4, at 56, 58.
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II. THE REASONING OF CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS’S OPINION IS THE
HOLDING OF THE CASE
Chief Justice Roberts’s ruling that economic mandates are
unconstitutional based on his analysis of the scope of the Commerce
and Necessary and Proper Clauses was the holding of the Court. In
Part IIIC of his opinion, which was joined without dissent by the four
liberal Justices, the Chief Justice writes: “The Court today holds that
our Constitution protects us from federal regulation under the
Commerce Clause so long as we abstain from the regulated activity.”19
Why the liberals concurred that this was the holding of the case is a
matter of speculation, but vote for it they did.
Contrary to the assertion that Chief Justice Roberts did not need to
reach the Commerce Clause issue, on his reasoning—which he alone
controls—he clearly did. The Chief Justice not only held that the
penalty could be justified as a tax; he also held that the penalty could be
justified only under a “saving construction”20 that eliminated the legal
requirement to buy health insurance and replaced it with an option to
buy insurance or pay the tax:
While the individual mandate clearly aims to induce the
purchase of health insurance, it need not be read to declare
that failing to do so is unlawful. Neither the Act nor any
other law attaches negative legal consequences to not
buying health insurance, beyond requiring a payment to the
IRS. The Government agrees with that reading, confirming
that if someone chooses to pay rather than obtain health
insurance, they have fully complied with the law.21
One does not identify the holding of a case by substituting an
alternative, narrower reasoning that the Court might have adopted but
did not, but rather, by evaluating the reasoning that was adopted—in
this case, by the deciding fifth vote in the case.
The fifth vote to uphold the rest of the ACA rested upon this
rationale every bit as much as Justice Lewis Powell’s fifth vote in Bakke
rested on “diversity.”22 As Chief Justice Roberts himself wrote,
“[w]ithout deciding the Commerce Clause question, I would find no
basis to adopt such a saving construction [of the penalty].”23 The fact
that the four dissenting conservative justices failed to formally join
19. Id. at 41–42 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 44.
21. Id. at 37.
22. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (“[T]he interest
of diversity is compelling in the context of a university’s admissions program . . . .”).
23. NFIB, supra note 4, at 44 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
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Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion (or even mention it) does not entail that
his reasoning is mere dictum. If it did, then his ruling that conditioning
all Medicaid funding on the states accepting the ACA’s expansion of
the program was unconstitutional would also be dictum.24 After all, it
was formally joined by just two other Justices, rather than by a majority,
yet no one denies its legal effect.
But in addition to the “formalist” justifications for this being the
holding, we have the “realist” fact that five Justices embraced the
entirety of our Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause
arguments. Critics can dismiss this as emanating from the leaderless Tea
Party all they like.25 But it is now embraced by “the rule of five.” And
even if the Tea Party played a role, we have long been told that this is
how the “living Constitution”—by which is meant the Supreme Court’s
doctrine—evolves in response to social movements. So, unless it is
“living constitutionalism for me, but not for thee” (if, that is, the
outcome of this case was indeed impelled by popular constitutionalism),
this would make it more rather than less legitimate on living
constitutionalist grounds.
III. THE COURT DID NOT UPHOLD THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE UNDER
THE TAX POWER
So, if we prevailed on all of our arguments about economic
mandates, how could the ACA be upheld? Some have claimed that the
Chief Justice upheld the power to impose economic mandates under the
tax power, and thus rendered the Commerce Clause and Necessary and
Proper Clause parts of his analysis superfluous and without practical
effect. As Justice Alito once responded, however, this is “not true.”
Chief Justice Roberts, I noted above, upheld the ACA by rewriting
the law’s “individual responsibility requirement” so that it was no
longer a mandate but merely an option: get insurance or pay a mild
“tax” penalty. Contrary to the statute, he ruled that anyone who did not
have to pay the penalty would have no legal duty to get insurance: “The
Federal Government does not have the power to order people to buy
health insurance. Section 5000A would therefore be unconstitutional if
read as a command.”26 Moreover, he wrote, “the statute reads more

24. See id. at 56 (“[W]e determine . . . that § 1396c is unconstitutional when applied to
withdraw existing Medicaid funds from States that decline to comply with the expansion.”).
25. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The June Surprises: Balls, Strikes, and the Fog of War,
SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 2, 2012, 12:19 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/08/the-junesurprises-balls-strikes-and-the-fog-of-war (making five disparaging connections between the
conservative justices and the Tea Party); id. (“Justice Kennedy’s question in oral argument,
faintly echoed in the Chief’s opinion, should be dismissed as empty Tea Party rhetoric.”).
26. NFIB, supra note 4, at 44 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
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naturally as a command to buy insurance than as a tax . . . .”27
Therefore, it is because he does away with the mandate by means of
a “saving construction” that Chief Justice Roberts finds the “penalty” to
be constitutional as a tax. Apparently, this is a difficult legal distinction
to grasp, but one that matters nonetheless. In the ACA, the mandate was
called an “individual responsibility requirement.”28 To “save” the rest of
the ACA, the Chief Justice essentially deleted the “requirement” part.
So the mandate qua mandate is gone. What is left is a tax. What is the
difference?
• Under the ACA as enacted, all Americans (who were not
exempted) had to buy health insurance. Under the Supreme
Court’s ruling, no American has to buy health insurance, though
some Americans will pay a tax if they do not.
• Under the ACA, millions of Americans who did not have to pay
the penalty because they did not pay any or enough income taxes
were still required by law to get insurance or be a lawbreaker.29
Under the Supreme Court’s revision, they do not.
• Under the ACA, those Americans who paid the penalty but did not
get health insurance were still outlaws because they disobeyed the
“requirement.” Under the Supreme Court’s ruling, if you pay the
tax, you are cool with the feds.30
Chief Justice John Roberts justified his recharacterization of the
“penalty” in the ACA as a tax on the ground that the amount involved is
so small as not to be coercive. It merely provided an “incentive,” like
how “Cash for Clunkers” provided a $4,500 incentive to trade in an old
car.31 Millions kept their old cars and effectively lost $4,500. In New
York v. United States,32 he reasoned, “we interpreted the statute to
impose only ‘a series of incentives’ for the State to take responsibility
for its waste. We then sustained the charge paid to the Federal
Government as an exercise of the taxing power. We see no
insurmountable obstacle to a similar approach here.”33
27. Id.
28. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(a)(1), 124
Stat. 119 (2010).
29. See NFIB, supra note 4, at 37 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (“Indeed, it is estimated that
four million people each year will choose to pay the IRS rather than buy insurance.”).
30. Id. at 38 (“Congress did not think it was creating four million outlaws.”).
31. See Kelsey Mays, Cash for Clunkers Two Years Later, KICKINGTIRES BLOG (Oct. 10,
2011), http://blogs.cars.com/kickingtires/2011/10/cash-for-clunkers-two-years-later.html; Jon
Gabriel, ‘Cash for Clunkers’ Killed Jobs, Hurt the Environment, FREEDOMWORKS (Jan. 5,
2013), http://www.freedomworks.org/blog/joncgabriel/crash-for-clunkers.
32. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
33. NFIB, supra note 4, at 38 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (quoting New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. at 169–74).
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The Court’s opinion implied that if this “tax” were so high as to
coerce compliance, it would then be an unconstitutional penalty: “[W]e
need not here decide the precise point at which an exaction becomes so
punitive that the taxing power does not authorize it. It remains true,
however, that the ‘power to tax is not the power to destroy while this
Court sits.’”34 Those who think that this criterion is judicially
unenforceable said the same thing about the Dole “coercion” test, which
Chief Justice Roberts and four Justices applied to the Medicaid
requirements being imposed on the states. As he did with the individual
mandate, Chief Justice Roberts rewrote the statute to eliminate this
coercive penalty on states.35
But this is not what is most important about converting the
individual insurance mandate into a tax on the failure to buy insurance.
Under the Court’s ruling, Congress is not free in the future to
supplement the monetary penalty with jail time. Had the Court accepted
the argument that the mandate was a constitutional regulation of
interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause, future Congresses
could jack up the amount of the penalty, and add prison time to boot.
Many believed that this would be inevitable because the penalties in
the ACA are too low to effectively compel the performance of those
who would be willing to violate the legal requirement to purchase
insurance. Now, in the absence of any mandate, thousands—even
millions—can opt to pay the tax rather than buy insurance, and
Congress is barred from significantly increasing the “tax” as it could
have increased the penalty had the view of the four liberal Justices
prevailed.
If one does not yet appreciate the difference between the rationale
urged by the government and most law professors and the one adopted
by the Chief Justice, consider this: the constitutionality of the
Controlled Substances Act is thought to be justified under the
Commerce Clause.36 If, however, it were only justified as a tax on
activity, then we would have to open the doors of federal prisons across
the country and release thousands of prisoners. And everyone in the
United States could smoke marijuana completely legally under federal
law—without risk, for example, of being disbarred—provided one paid
a small, noncoercive tax. That would be an enormous difference from
current public policy, and would constitute a substantial increase in

34. Id. at 43 (quoting Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Tex. Co., 336 U.S. 342, 364 (1949) (quoting
Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
35. See id. at 56 (“[W]e determine . . . that § 1396c is unconstitutional when applied to
withdraw existing Medicaid funds from States that decline to comply with the expansion.”).
36. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15 (2005).
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individual liberty.37
IV. THE BAD DOCTRINE THAT CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS MADE WAS NOT
AS BAD AS THE ALTERNATIVES
Chief Justice Roberts’s decision made bad law in two respects. First,
he claimed the power to rewrite a law by giving it a “saving
construction” to uphold it after he admitted this was not the best reading
of what the law actually said.38 This was bad because the statute that
will now be implemented is not the law that was written by Congress,
but is instead a law written by one Justice. The statute that is now being
enforced did not command the assent of both houses of Congress and
agreement by the President.
The principal constraint on the tax power is political and, for
political reasons, Congress could not enact the penalty as a tax. Now,
the Court has enacted a law that the political process could not, which
undermines the political process itself. Moreover, under this approach,
Congress may now enact laws with the expectation that the Court will
fix any constitutional problems the laws may have, an expectation that
reduces any incentive Congress has to address constitutional issues
itself.
Second, the Chief Justice allowed that Congress may impose an
unprecedented tax on inactivity. But had he upheld the mandate under
the tax power (as some claim he did) this would have been little
different from upholding it under the Commerce Clause, though the
remedy would be limited to a punitive fine, rather than imprisonment.
Because the amount of the penalty was low enough to preserve the tax
payer’s “choice” to obey or pay, Chief Justice Roberts allowed the
“penalty” to stand as a tax and held the mandate unconstitutional under
any power. On his reasoning, even a punitive fine would be
unconstitutional under the tax power.
Moreover, Congress always had the power to tax persons solely
because of their status—which is called a “direct” tax—provided the tax
was apportioned equally among the states.39 Now, as a result of this
ruling, Congress has the unprecedented power to tax inactivity without
apportioning the incidence of such a tax equally among the states. But
this new power to tax is limited to nonpunitive taxes that preserve the
option of not acting as Congress desires.

37. See generally Randy E. Barnett, The Harmful Side Effects of Drug Prohibition, 2009
UTAH L. REV. 11 (2009).
38. NFIB, supra note 4, at 44 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (“[T]he statute reads more
naturally as a command to buy insurance than as a tax . . . .”).
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in
Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”).

2013]

WHO WON THE OBAMACARE CASE

1341

Both of these maneuvers made constitutional law worse by allowing
a new power to tax inaction without apportionment among the states.
But, as I see it, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion made the constitutional
law implementing the Commerce Clause, Necessary and Proper Clause,
and spending power better in more important ways. Together with the
four conservative dissenters, Chief Justice Roberts provided a fifth vote
for the propositions that the powers of Congress were limited by
Article I of the Constitution; that the Supreme Court would enforce
these limits; that the individual insurance mandate exceeded the powers
of Congress under the Commerce Clause; that compulsion to engage in
commerce was “improper” under the Necessary and Proper Clause; and
that Congress could not use its spending power to withhold existing
funding in an effort to coerce states into vastly expanding the Medicaid
program. These are all positions that a majority of law professors had
denied and argued against. But in the ACA challenge case, all of these
positions were adopted by five Justices.
V. DOES THE DOCTRINE MATTER?
In the end, realistically, how much does this improvement in
constitutional doctrine really matter? Does NFIB mean that the Supreme
Court will uphold a federal law by hook or by crook? Would the Court
adhere to this doctrine if it really made a difference in a big case? Is this
not merely “symbolic federalism” at best? Although the answers to
these questions require speculating about the future, to see why doctrine
matters, let me offer the following thought experiment.
Suppose that, at the urging of insurance companies, Congress were
now to amend the ACA to impose a criminal sanction on the failure to
purchase health insurance, or decided to greatly increase the “tax” on
the status of failing to have health insurance. Would law professors
dismiss a constitutional challenge to these measures as “frivolous”? I
doubt it. How would lower courts likely rule? I think it is obvious that
most district court judges would invalidate enactments like these, and
the circuit court of appeals would doubtlessly uphold their rulings.
Would the Supreme Court even grant certiorari in such a case? I doubt
it. Such is the significance of the holding of NFIB.
Doctrine certainly constrained us in our challenge to the ACA. We
would have liked to contest the insurance company regulations as
outside the bounds of the original meaning of the Commerce Clause.
But we were definitively foreclosed from making such an argument by
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association.40
Of course a change in the Justices could negate the importance of the
NFIB decision, but that could happen with any doctrine. And this is as
40. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
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possible with an additional conservative Justice as it is with an
additional progressive Justice. Supreme Court doctrine is always
“living.” But ask any litigant whether doctrine matters so long as it
survives, and I believe the answer will tell you that the doctrine
established by the NFIB decision matters too.
I have heard some claim that the NFIB ruling is of marginal
significance because the Court barred only economic mandates, which
Congress has never before adopted and which Congress is unlikely to
adopt in the future. Yet, as I insisted for two years in the face of claims
that a ruling invalidating the ACA would undermine the entire edifice of
federal programs, all such a ruling in our favor would have done was
bar Congress from using economic mandates in the future. Here is how
I usually closed my speeches on the implications of invalidating the
ACA: “Should the Supreme Court decide that Congress may not
commandeer the people in this way, such a doctrine would only affect
one law: the PPACA. Because Congress has never done anything like
this before, the Supreme Court does not need to strike down any
previous mandate.”41
The true scope of our legal victory is measured by the constitutional
theories we prevented the United States Supreme Court from adopting.
While our failure to prevent the egregious Affordable Care Act from
taking effect remains a bitter disappointment, this should not detract
from what we accomplished:
• We fought this case to deny the federal government the power to
compel citizens to engage in economic activity. On this we won.
• We fought this case to prevent the Court from adopting the
argument that Congress may adopt any means, not expressly
prohibited, when regulating the national economy. On this we
won.
• We fought this case to prevent an end run around the limits on the
Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause by using the
tax power instead. On this we won a partial, but significant,
victory.
• We fought this case to establish that the dictum in South Dakota v.
Dole42 that conditions on federal spending that constitute
compulsion on states are unconstitutional. On this we also won.
In sum, we prevailed in preserving the enumerated powers scheme of
Article I, Section 8, as a protection of liberty. As the Chief Justice
wrote:
41. Randy E. Barnett, Turning Citizens into Subjects: Why the Health Insurance Mandate
is Unconstitutional, 62 MERCER L. REV. 608, 617 (2011).
42. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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Today, the restrictions on government power foremost in
many Americans’ minds are likely to be affirmative
prohibitions, such as contained in the Bill of Rights. These
affirmative prohibitions come into play, however, only
where the Government possesses authority to act in the first
place. If no enumerated power authorizes Congress to pass
a certain law, that law may not be enacted, even if it would
not violate any of the express prohibitions in the Bill of
Rights or elsewhere in the Constitution.
....
The Federal Government has expanded dramatically over
the past two centuries, but it still must show that a
constitutional grant of power authorizes each of its actions.
....
Our respect for Congress’s policy judgments thus can never
extend so far as to disavow restraints on federal power that
the Constitution carefully constructed. . . . . And there can
be no question that it is the responsibility of this Court to
enforce the limits on federal power by striking down acts of
Congress that transgress those limits.43
This is what we fought to preserve. Congress may not mandate or
require activity. Under the holding of the Court, Congress may only
encourage the activity by imposing a nonpunitive and noncoercive tax
on inactivity while keeping the failure to engage in that activity
completely legal. I consider this a victory for both the Constitution and
for liberty.
VI. WHY WERE THE LAW PROFESSORS SO WRONG?
Most law professors believed that the individual insurance mandate
in the Affordable Care Act was so obviously justified by the Commerce
and Necessary and Proper Clauses that there could be no serious
challenge to its constitutionality.44 In a poll conducted by the American
43. NFIB, supra note 4, at 3, 6 (citations omitted).
44. See, e.g., The Constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act: Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Walter Dellinger III, Douglas B. Maggs Professor
of Law at Duke University) (“[T]here are so many ways that the minimum coverage
requirement is an appropriate exercise of Congress’s power to regulate the national economy
that it is difficult to know where to begin.”); Akhil Reed Amar, Constitutional Showdown: A
Florida Judge Distorted the Law in Striking Down Healthcare Reform, L.A. TIMES
(Feb. 6, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/print/2011/feb/06/opinion/la-oe-amar-health-carelegal-20110206 (“My students understand the Constitution better than [Judge Roger Vinson].”);
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Bar Association, 85% of experts predicted that the Affordable Care Act
would be fully upheld.45 Indeed, some law professors went so far as to
call any constitutional challenge “frivolous” and one even warned that
he “fully expect[s] the lawyers who sign the briefs to face a motion for
Rule 11 sanctions and, if they appeal to a federal court of appeals, for
costs.”46 Multiple amicus curiae briefs were submitted to the Supreme
Court by professors in support of the ACA’s constitutionality, garnering
104, 20, 9, and 6 signatures respectively.47 An open letter was also
Erwin Chemerinsky, Health Care Reform is Constitutional, POLITICO (Oct. 23, 2009, 4:59 AM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1009/28620.html (“Those opposing health care reform are
increasingly relying on an argument that has no legal merit . . . .”); Abbe R. Gluck & Gillian
Metzger, Just the Facts: Health Economics and Constitutional Doctrine, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug.
4, 2011, 9:37 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/just-the-facts-health-economics-andconstitutional-doctrine (“[S]ince the New Deal, the Court has always deferred to the specifics of
congressional regulatory choices when it has perceived that the overall context that Congress is
regulating is an economic or commercial one.”); Rick Hills, Comment to Is the
Health Care Legislation Constitutional?, PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 28, 2010, 10:22 AM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/03/the-health-care-legislation-is-constitutional
-part-i-nec-proper.html (“Randy and Ilya have been led astray by their love of libertarianism,
reading into the doctrine of enumerated powers some implied ban on really coercive mandates
on private individuals. But the doctrine, in both its letter and spirit, lacks any such ban.”); Aziz
Huq, Bad Law, Smart Politics in Constitutional Challenges to Healthcare Reform, THENATION
(Apr. 15, 2010), http://www.thenation.com/article/bad-law-smart-politics-constitutionalchallenges-healthcare-reform (“Highly speculative and doctrinally out-to-sea, these suits cannot
be about the law. As their timing shows, they are a continuation of politics by other means.”);
Dawn Johnsen, The Simple Case for the Affordable Care Act’s Constitutionality, SCOTUSBLOG
(Aug. 3, 2011, 9:22 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/the-simple-case-for-theaffordable-care-acts-constitutionality (“Since 1937, following an infamous stretch of nowdiscredited opinions narrowly interpreting ‘commerce among the several states’ to invalidate
progressive legislation, the Court nearly always has upheld federal statutes against challenges
that they exceeded Congress’s authority.”); Timothy S. Jost, Pro & Con: State Lawsuits Won’t
Succeed in Overturning the Individual Mandate, 29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1225, 1225 (2010),
available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/29/6/1225.full.html (“These challenges have
no legal merit and are a serious distraction from the real work that lies before the states.”);
Laurence H. Tribe, On Health Care, Justice Will Prevail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2011, at A27,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/08/opinion/08tribe.html (“Since the New Deal,
the [C]ourt has consistently held that Congress has broad constitutional power to regulate
interstate commerce. . . . . By that standard, this law’s constitutionality is open and shut.”);
Robert Schapiro, Following Judge Sutton’s Rejection of the “Inactivity” Argument, the Supreme
Court Can Take its Time, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 5, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2011/08/following-judge-sutton%E2%80%99s-rejection-of-the-%E2%80%9Cinactivity%E2%
80%9D-argument-the-supreme-court-can-take-its-time (“The Court would have to create a new
limitation on congressional power, a limitation that appears ungrounded, unclear, and
unnecessary.”).
45. Steven D. Schwinn, The Medicaid Expansion Issue, 39 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CAS.
29, 32 (2012).
46. Brian D. Galle, Why Tax Cheats Love the AG Suits Challenging Health Care Reform,
PRAWFSBLAWG (Apr. 3, 2010, 11:43 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/04/
why-tax-cheats-love-the-ag-suits-challenging-health-care-reform.html.
47. Brief for 104 Health Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners
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published by 130 law professors arguing that “[t]he current challenges
to the constitutionality of this legislation seek to jettison nearly two
centuries of settled constitutional law,” and that “there can be no serious
doubt about the constitutionality of the minimum coverage provision.”48
(Minimum Coverage Provision), Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012) (No. 11-398); Brief for Law Professors Barry Friedman, Matthew Adler, et al., as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners and Reversal on the Minimum-Coverage Provision Issue, Dep’t of
Health and Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398); Brief for
Constitutional Law and Economics Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners
(Minimum Coverage Provision), Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012) (No. 11-398); Brief for Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision), Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. v. Florida, 132
S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398).
48. Open Letter, Over 100 Law Professors Agree on Affordable Care Act’s
Constitutionality, http://www.fcan.org/Health_care/law_professors_ACA.pdf. The following
law professors signed at least one of the referenced documents: Libby Adler, Matthew Adler,
Vikram Amar, Lori Andrews, George Annas, Paul Arshagouni, Frank Askin, Reuven AviYonah, Richard Aynes, Ashutosh Baghwat, Jack Balkin, Ian Bartrum, W. Eugene Basanta,
Joseph Bauer, Theresa Beiner, Peter Bell, Eric Berger, Micah Berman, Vincent Blasi, Eric
Blumenson, Alfred Blumrosen, Richard Bonnie, Kathleen Boozang, Linda Bosniak, Dayna
Bowen Matthew, Michele Bratcher Goodwin, John Britain, Karen Brown, Mark Brown,
Rebecca Brown, Harold Bruff, Neil Buchanan, Kim Buchanon, Scott Burris, Patricia Cain,
Steve Calandrillo, Emily Calhoun, Alexander Capron, Kathy Cerminara, Marguerite Chapman,
Guy-Uriel Charles, Erwin Chemerinsky, Jesse Choper, Kimberly Cogdell Boies, David Cohen,
Glenn Cohen, Steven Cohen, Thomas Colby, Carl Coleman, Michael Curtis, Richard Daynard,
Walter Dellinger III, Neal Devins, John DiPippa, Janet Dolgin, Michael Dorf, Erica Eisinger,
Einer Elhauge, Peter Enrich, Cheryl Erwin, Susan Estrich, Dan Faber, Daniel Farber, Linda
Fentiman, Barbara Fick, Margaret Foster Riley, Jacqueline Fox, David Frankford, Barry
Friedman, Howard Friedman, Lawrence Friedman, Barry Furrow, Lance Gable, Brian Galle,
Cindy Galway Buys, Michael Gerhardt, Margaret Gilhooley, Leonard Glantz, Hazel Glenn Beh,
Abbe Gluck, Lee Goldman, Robert Goldstein, Risa Goluboff, Laura Gomez, Thomas (Tim)
Greaney, Henry Greely, Craig Green, Michael Greenberger, Abner Greene, Jamal Greene,
Edwin Greenebaum, Kent Greenfield, Dan Greenwood, Ariela Gross, Sofia Gruskin, Mark Hall,
Paul Hardin, Melissa Hart, Dean Hashimoto, Rick Hills, Christina Ho, Michael Hoffheimer,
Allison Hoffman, Barbara Hoffman, Sharona Hoffman, Nicole Huberfeld, Wilson Huhn, Nan
Hunter, Jonathan Hyman, Dawn Johnsen, Calvin Johnson, Vincent Johnson, Tim Jost, David
Kairys, Kenneth Karst, Kenneth Katkin, Mark Kaufman, Gregory Keating, Fazal Khan, Neil
Kinkopf, Eleanor Kinney, Heidi Kitrosser, Edward Kleinbard, Carlton Larson, Sylvia Law,
Robert Leflar, Laurie Levenson, Hope Lewis, Ethan Lieb, Rory Little, Christine Littleton,
Kristin Madison, Gregory Magarian, Wendy Mariner, William Marshall, Jerry Marshaw,
Thaddeus Mason Pope, Anna Mastroianni, Thomas Mayo, Stephen McJohn, Mark McKenna,
Maxwell Mehlman, Ajay Mehrotra, Alan Meisel, Michael Meltsner, Leslie Meltzer Henry, Saul
Mendlovitz, Gillian Metzger, Kate Mewhinney, Frances Miller, Alan Morrison, Trevor
Morrison, Scott Moss, Eric Muller, Gene Nichol, William Novak, Michele Oberman, Christiana
Ochoa, Aviva Orenstein, David Orentlicher, Kevin Outterson, Efthimios Parasidis, Wendy
Parmet, Sallyann Payton, Philip Peters, Andrew Pincus, Richard Primus, Vernellia Randall,
Judith Resnik, Edward Richards, David Ritchie, Jessica Roberts, Gwendolyn Roberts Majette,
Christopher Robertson, John Robertson, Patricia (Winnie) Roche, Marc Rodwin, Daria
Roithmayr, Kermit Roosevelt, Mark Rosen, Sara Rosenbaum, Rand Rosenblatt, Karen
Rothenberg, James Rowen, Theodore Ruger, Sallie Sanford, Richard Saphire, Richard Saver,
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Although several law professors, such as Jack Balkin, thought the
mandate could also be justified under the tax power,49 no one who
believed this publicly stated that it was only justified under the tax
power and was unconstitutional under the commerce power. And only
two professors I know of—Neil Siegal and Robert Cooter50—saw that,
to uphold it as a tax, Section 5000A would have to be rewritten to
eliminate its express requirement that all Americans “shall” purchase
private health insurance, though neither to my knowledge denied that it
was within Congress’s commerce power.
Why did so many law professors miss the mark in predicting this
reasoning? Part of the explanation is, of course, that law professors
largely exist in an ideological bubble in which folks like me are either
nonexistent or can be dismissed as marginal because we are so few in
number. But that is not the whole story. After all, even some politically
conservative law professors accepted the consensus view.51
I believe most law professors missed the boat in this case because
they never properly understood the New Federalism of the Rehnquist
Court. They share what my Georgetown colleague Larry Solum has
called the same “constitutional gestalt” about the meaning of the socalled New Deal settlement.52 To oversimplify, they think the New Deal
and Warren Court’s rulings established that the Commerce and
Necessary and Proper Clauses give Congress a power to regulate the
national economy at its discretion, subject only the express prohibitions
in the Constitution and perhaps some selected unenumerated rights.
Nadia Sawicki, Richard Schragger, Robert Schwartz, Steve Schwinn, Paul Secunda, Ilene
Seidman, Ted Seto, Jeffrey Shaman, Darien Shanske, David Shapiro, Suzanna Sherry, Sheila
Shulman, Neil Siegel, Jessica Silbey, Ross Silverman, Joshua Silverstein, Lawrence Singer,
Joseph Slater, Jessica Slavin, Jennifer Smith, Peter Smith, Robert Smith, Lloyd Snyder, Roy
Spece, Carla Spivak, Ralph Michael Stein, Geoffrey Stone, Evelyn Tenenbaum, Nicolas Terry,
Lance Tibbles, Jay Tidmarsh, Daniel Tokaji, Franita Tolson, Stacey Tovino, Paul Tractenberg,
Laurence Tribe, David Trueman, Jonathan Varat, Walter Wadlington, Elizabeth Weeks
Leonard, Joanna Weinberg, Deborah Weissman, Judith Welch Wegner, Lindsay Wiley, Norman
Williams, Adam Winkler, Susan Wolf, Jean Wright Veilleux, Rebecca Zietlow.
49. Jack M. Balkin, The Health-Care Mandate is Clearly a Tax—And Therefore
Constitutional, THE ATLANTIC (May 4, 2012, 3:10 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2012/05/the-health-care-mandate-is-clearly-a-tax-0151-and-therefore-constitutional/25
6706.
50. See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy: An Effects Theory
of the Tax Power, 98 VA. L. REV. 1195, 1246–47 (2012).
51. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, Some Tentative Thoughts on the Constitutionality of the
Individual Mandate Under Current Supreme Court Doctrine, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 6,
2010, 2:25 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2010/10/06/some-tentative-thoughts-on-the-constitutiona
lity-of-the-individual-mandate-under-current-supreme-court-doctrine.
52. See Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional Gestalt 3
(Washington University Law Review, Georgetown Pub. Law Research Paper No. 12-152,
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2152653.
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When it was decided, United States v. Lopez53 was thought to be
heretical precisely because it seemed to threaten this gestalt. At the
time, some dismissed it as an aberrational decision that ought to be
reversed. Some still do. Others rationalized its distinction between
“economic” and “noneconomic” activity as identifying the outer
boundary of national economic regulation. Still others may have
thought that this aspect of the New Federalism was abandoned by the
Court in Gonzales v. Raich54 case when Justices Kennedy and Scalia
voted to uphold the Controlled Substances Act. Moreover, two of the
three Justices in the dissent in Raich had been replaced by Justices with
little or no pre-existing commitment to finding any limits on the
enumerated powers of Congress, leaving only Justice Thomas open to
the argument that the individual mandate exceeded the powers of
Congress.
If a law professor held any of these views, the healthcare challenge
was an easy case. After all, the ACA truly was a comprehensive scheme
to regulate the national economy. The individual insurance mandate
could be seen as both necessary to this scheme and not in conflict with
any express prohibition of the Constitution. End of story. Anyone who
suggested anything to the contrary was advocating the undoing of the
New Deal Settlement and a return to the bad old pre-New Deal
constitutional gestalt of the evil Lochner Era,55 or even to Dred Scott.56
53. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
54. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
55. See, e.g., Vikram D. Amar, Reflections on the Doctrinal and Big-Picture Issues
Raised by the Constitutional Challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(Obamacare), 6 FIU L. REV. 9, 9 (2010) (“[S]uch success [of the challenges] would either be
revolutionary (in the way that Justice Clarence Thomas’ desire to return to nineteenth century
cases concerning the scope of federal power would, if implemented, completely upend the
current constitutional convention), or it would be tailored to reach a particular result on a
particular contentious issue (in the way Bush v. Gore is viewed by many as a ruling good for
only one day and one election).”) (footnotes omitted); Mark A. Hall, Commerce Clause
Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1825, 1829 (2011) (“Following the
Court’s repudiation of Lochner jurisprudence, there is no conceivable basis to argue that the
Constitution specially protects an individual’s freedom to be uninsured.”) (footnote omitted);
Peter J. Smith, Federalism, Lochner, and the Individual Mandate, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1723, 1726
(2011) (“But because the objections to the individual mandate, though couched in federalism
terms, have very little to do with federalism at all, it is difficult to see them as anything other
than Lochner under a different guise.”); Jeffrey Rosen, Are Liberals Trying to Intimidate John
Roberts?, NEW REPUBLIC (May 28, 2012), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/103656/
obamacare-affordable-care-act-critics-response (“[The challengers’] ambition was far more
radical: to strike down regulations at the heart of the post New Deal regulatory state.”); Andrew
Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of Health Care Reform,
121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 22–23 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/04/26/koppelman.html
(“Many in the legal community have regarded the constitutional objection to the mandate as a
return to Lochner, but the ‘right’ that the mandate is supposed to violate was too much even for
the Lochner Court.”) (footnote omitted); Trevor Morrison, Alarmism and the ACA,
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But law professors missed the possibility of an alternate
interpretation of the New Deal Settlement that comprises a third
constitutional gestalt—the gestalt that informed our whole litigation
strategy. It is this: for better or worse, all of the powers that were
approved by the New Deal and Warren Courts are now to be taken as
constitutional. But any claim of additional new powers still needs
justification. Put another way, the expansion of congressional power
authorized by the New Deal and Warren Courts established a new highwater mark of constitutional power. Going any higher than this,
however, requires special justification.
This gestalt can be summarized as “this far and no further”—
provided “no further” is not taken as an absolute, but merely as
establishing a baseline beyond which serious justification is needed.57
As Chief Justice Rehnquist observed in United States v. Morrison,58
BALKINIZATION (Mar. 25, 2012, 10:01 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/03/alarmism-andaca.html (“Ultimately, these folks are manifestly not concerned with helping the Court but are
instead interested in using alarmist rhetoric to advance a very different project: returning
Congress’s regulatory power to its pre-New Deal state, and perhaps even pre-McCulloch v.
Maryland, state.”); Steven Schwinn, The ACA and the Tenth Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug.
5, 2011, 1:38 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/the-aca-and-the-tenth-amendment
(“These arguments are novel and ahistorical, representing nothing less than a bald-faced attempt
to rewrite the Constitution in a libertarian image.”); Patricia J. Williams, Judges With a Clear
Agenda, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2012, 1:43 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/
2012/03/25/on-the-health-care-law-is-the-court-being-thoughtful-or-partisan/activist-judgeswith-a-clear-agenda (“Limiting the [C]ommerce [C]lause in the fashion pressed by these
appellants would also undo the legal grounding for . . . well, everything: the Social Security
Act . . . the Occupational and Safety Health Act, the Clean Air Act, all federal disaster relief, the
Anti-Trust Act, the Equal Pay Act, and all jurisprudence relating to public accommodations,
including the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”); cf. Stanford Univ. Hosts Debate on Affordable Care
Act (C-SPAN television broadcast Mar. 12, 2012), available at http://www.c-span.org/Events/CSPAN-Event/10737428979 (“I would cite . . . what Justice Scalia says to people like me about
Bush v. Gore: ‘Get over it!’ The New Deal settlement is not going away.”); Ronald Dworkin,
Why the Mandate is Constitutional: The Real Argument, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (May
10, 2012), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/may/10/why-mandate-constitutionalreal-argument/?pagination=false (“[If the Court rules the ACA unconstitutional], we would have
to accept that our eighteenth-century constitution is not the enduring marvel of statesmanship
we suppose but an anachronistic, crippling burden we cannot escape, a straitjacket that makes it
impossible for us to achieve a just national society.”). Note that none of the law professors cited
in this footnote are listed in supra note 44.
56. See Amar, supra note 44 (“In 1857, another judge named Roger distorted the
Constitution, disregarded precedent, disrespected Congress and proclaimed that the basic
platform of one of America’s two major political parties was unconstitutional. The case was
Dred Scott vs. Sanford . . . . History has not been kind to that judge. Roger Vinson, meet Roger
Taney.”).
57. For a similar assessment of the Rehnquist Court’s New Federalism, see John Valauri,
Baffled by Inactivity: The Individual Mandate and the Commerce Power, 10 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 51, 63 (2012) (describing the “‘thus far’ method and justification of constitutional line
drawing”).
58. 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
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“thus far in our Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce
Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where the activity is
economic in nature.”59 This is why the general acceptance of our claim
that the individual insurance mandate was “unprecedented” was so
crucial to the unexpected legal success we enjoyed. Accepting our claim
that the mandate was unprecedented placed the burden of justification
on the government.
Which brings me to a second tenet of the constitutional gestalt of the
New Federalism: Any purported justification that would lead to an
unlimited reading of Congress’s Article I, Section 8 powers would
improperly contradict what Chief Justice Rehnquist called the “first
principles” of our constitutional law.60 This is why the claim that
“healthcare is a national problem” and other similar rationales offered
by the government and by many law professors fell on five deaf ears.
All these rationales, if accepted, would lead to a national police power
qualified only by the Bill of Rights (as are state police powers). And
this was contrary to the constitutional gestalt of the Rehnquist Court’s
New Federalism.61
CONCLUSION: THE GRAVITATIONAL FORCE OF ORIGINALISM
Even if you accept this description of the Rehnquist Court’s
constitutional gestalt, you may still object: Why this far and no further?
Why draw the line at this point? Is this not arbitrary? Besides, where is
all of this in the Constitution?
Here is where the growth of originalism since the 1980s enters the
picture. Unlike District of Columbia v. Heller,62 which was argued and
decided on originalist grounds,63 in our challenge to the ACA we made
no originalist claims whatsoever. But the original meaning of the
Constitution still played a role because it lies behind the Rehnquist
Court’s New Federalism, exerting a gravitational force that also now
extends to the Roberts Court. By “gravitational force,” I am not making
a Dworkinian claim about the analytic force or pull of legal reasoning,
but instead making a socio-cultural claim about the influence of
originalist interpretation on even nonoriginalist doctrinal construction.64
59. Id. at 613 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
60. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
61. To be clear, I am merely identifying what I think that gestalt is. When it comes to the
Article I, Section 8 powers of Congress (but not civil rights and liberties), I favor the pre-New
Deal gestalt of attempting, however imperfectly, to hold Congress to the scope of powers
defined by the original meaning of the “Powers herein granted.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
62. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
63. See id. at 576–619.
64. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 121 (1977) (“If [Hercules]
classifies some event as a mistake, then he does not deny its specific authority but he does deny
its gravitational force, and he cannot consistently appeal to that force in other arguments.”).
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But the ideas are similar.
Simply put: During the New Deal era, Americans acquiesced to an
enormous expansion of federal power and the United States Supreme
Court eventually expanded its interpretation of federal power
accordingly. This expansion is now settled precedent. But with respect
to the Article I, Section 8 powers of Congress, the powers upheld by the
New Deal, Warren, and Burger Courts violated the original meaning of
the Constitution. Because this expansion was illegitimate on originalist
grounds, any further expansion must be justified, and any purported
justification that would essentially eliminate the enumerated powers
scheme in the original Constitution is unacceptable or improper.
Of course, many if not most law professors reject the “this far and no
farther” gestalt in favor of the gestalt that interprets the New Deal as
establishing something like a “national problems power” in Congress.
And many also reject the analysis of the Commerce and Necessary and
Proper Clauses in Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion and in the opinion of
the four dissenters. But I think if we are to understand the NFIB
decision and the New Federalism cases that preceded it, we cannot do
so accurately unless we take into account the alternate reading of the
New Deal Settlement that animated the Rehnquist Court, and that we
now know also animates the Roberts Court.
Given that the actual holding in NFIB is that Congress may never
again impose an economic mandate on the people by means of its
commerce power—something Congress had never done before—this
may be the most important legal implication of NIFB v. Sebelius: The
New Federalism’s constitutional gestalt still has five votes. Achieving
that in this case was no small feat.

